

DACOWITS QUARTERLY MEETING
 December 6-7, 2011
 Hilton Washington Dulles Airport
 13869 Park Center Road, Herndon, Virginia 20171



Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Time	Topic and Presenter	Location
0830-0845	Welcome Comments and Introductions <i>Ms. Nancy Duff Campbell, Acting Chair, DACOWITS</i>	Piedmont I/II
0845-0915	2011 Report Review and Approval <i>Committee</i>	
Assignments Subcommittee		
0915-1015	Integration of Women into Combat Units <i>Ms. Karen Davis, Canadian National Defence</i>	Piedmont I/II
1015-1030	Break	
1030-1115	Army Briefing on Assignment Policies <i>MAJ Trina Rice, US Army</i>	Piedmont I/II
1115-1200	Army Briefing on Cultural Support Teams <i>CPT Adrienne Bryant, Cultural Support Team Program Office</i>	
1200-1330	Lunch	
Wellness Subcommittee		
1330-1415	Gender Disparities in Suicides of Active Duty Army Service Members <i>Dr. Amy Millikan, Army Public Health Command</i>	Piedmont I/II
1415-1500	Gender Disparities in Suicides of Veterans <i>Dr. Jan Kemp, Department of Veterans Affairs</i>	
1500-1515	Break	
1515-1645	Gender Disparities in Retention <i>Ms. Angella McGinnis, Defense Manpower Data Center</i>	Piedmont I/II
	Retention at the OSD and Service Level	

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Time	Topic and Presenter	Location
1300-1415	2012 Study Topics Presentation and Discussion	Piedmont I/II
	2012 Installation Visit Discussion <i>Committee</i>	
1415-1500	Public Comment Period	

Integration of Women into the Canadian Forces Combat Arms

Karen D. Davis

Chief of Military Personnel

Director General Military Personnel
Research & Analysis and

Canadian Forces Leadership Institute

Presentation to:

*U.S. Defense Advisory Committee
on Women in the Services*

6 December 2011



National
Defence

Défense
nationale

Canada 

Overview

- Lead Up to Integration of Socio-legal Milestones
- Combat Related Employment of Women
- Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Ruling
- Challenges
- Lessons Learned
- Current Status of Women in the Combat Arms

Lead Up to Women in the Combat Arms

- 1969: Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada
- 1978: Canadian Human Rights Act
- 1986: Canadian Forces (CF) Charter Task Force on Equality

Combat Related Employment of Women (CREW)

- Determine *if, when and how* restrictions on the employment of women in previously all-male occupations and units should be removed
- Trial shall not unduly jeopardize operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces
- Trials will be scientific
- Minimum numbers/proportions of women established by unit to facilitate measurement of impact of women on effectiveness
- Operational effectiveness defined (but not measureable)
- First women recruited into the land combat arms
Apr 1988

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Ruling

- 10 years (1989-1999) to integrate women into all environments and roles (except submarines)
 - CREW no longer trials, but steps toward full integration
 - Removal of all restrictions to employment of women (including male minimum requirement in mixed gender units)
 - Must be internal and external monitoring of policy, with appropriate and immediate modifications
 - Mutually acceptable implementation plan to be developed by Canadian Human Rights Commission and Canadian Forces

CREW - Early Challenges

- Only 1 of the first 25 women who attempted entry level infantry soldier training was successful (non-commissioned)
- Lack of success attributed to selection criteria, fitness training, and group dynamics
- Recommendations:
 - critical mass of 10+ women per infantry course to provide same sex psychological support
 - female infantry recruits be required to meet male physical fitness standard at recruit school

Land Combat Arms - Limited Progress

- By 1997, the trained effective strength of women in the combat arms:
 - Officer
 - Armoured Officer 3 (0.7%)
 - Artillery Officer 6 (1.3%)
 - Infantry Officer 1 (0.1%)
 - Non-Commissioned
 - Crewman 11 (.7%)
 - Artillery (Field) 18 (1.5%)
 - Artillery (Air Defence) 9 (2.9%)
 - Infantry 3 (0.06%)
 - Field Engineer 12 (1.2%)
- Attrition of women ranged from 21% (FD Eng) to 70% (Inf); 2.3 (FD Eng) to 6.4 (Inf) times the attrition rate of men

Leadership in a Diverse Army

- Developed in response to challenges of women in combat arms and requirements of the *Employment Equity Act*
- Numerous action items
 - Family and career research
 - Harassment and related policy reviews
 - Diversity training program for combat units
 - Workforce analysis
 - Communications planning
 - Recruiting initiatives

Critical Role of Committed Leadership

- At all levels, from Chief of Defence Staff to junior leaders at unit level; one broken link creates conditions for rogue leadership based on individual/status quo cultural values and beliefs
- Chief of the Defence Staff, 1998
 - Canadian Forces wide message firmly stating that it was the personal and professional responsibility of all members to take action in event of inappropriate behaviour; turning a blind eye was not acceptable and all individuals would be held accountable for their actions

Lessons Learned

- Critical role of leadership
- Gender neutral physical standards essential; must be based on what is required to do the job
- Critical mass can help, but is not key to success
- Behaviour important, attitude critical
- Unit culture matters
- Operational effectiveness, including successful integration of women, is determined at the unit level
- Success is shared (leaders, peers and subordinates) not the onus of individual women to take on all of the challenges in isolation

Status of Women in Combat Arms (2011)

	Officers	Non-Commissioned Members
Regular Force	134 (4.2%)	165 (1.5%)
Primary Reserve	37 (3.4%)	277 (5.8%)
TOTAL	171 (4.0%)	442 (2.8%)

Questions?

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UPDATE ON ARMY ASSIGNMENT POLICY



BLUF

- **DoD Policy must be modified to reflect realities of present and future operational environments while incorporating the operational flexibility for Services to leverage the talent of women while simultaneously balancing increased career opportunities and ensuring the safety and security of the nation.**
- **Over the last 10 years more than 135,000 women have deployed in support of Overseas Contingency operations.**



AGENDA

- **Background**
 - **SEC ARMY Review of Current Policy**
 - **Current DoD policy**
 - **Current Army policy**
- **Potential Options and Effects**
- **Implementation**
- **Path Forward**



SECARMY Review

Events leading up to SECARMY review of current Army policy:

March 1992: Current Army policy published (AR 600-13, Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers)

January 1994: Current DoD policy published (SECDEF memo)

2007: RAND report identifies differences between DoD and Army policies

SECARMY ASKED: *Can we comply with OSD-PR's 2007 RAND Report recommendations and align Army policy with current DoD policy, without Congressional notification?*



Current DoD Policy

- **SECDEF memo, Jan 1994:**
 - **Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose **primary mission** is to engage in **direct combat on the ground**.**
 - **[The Services'] policies and regulations may include the following restrictions on the assignment of women:**
 - **where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive**
 - **where units and positions are **doctrinally required** to physically **collocate and remain** with direct ground combat units that are closed to women**
 - **where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions**
 - **where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members**



Current Army Policy

- IAW AR 600-13, 27 March 1992:
 - The Army's assignment policy for female Soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a **routine mission** to engage in **direct combat**, or which **collocate routinely** with units assigned a **direct combat** mission.

 - Current rules for coding positions closed to women (AR 600-13)
 - The specialty or position requires routine engagement in **direct combat**;
 - The position is in a battalion or smaller size unit that has a mission of **routine engagement in direct combat**;
 - The position is in a unit that **routinely collocates** with battalion or smaller size units assigned a mission to engage in **direct combat**;
 - The position is in a portion of a unit that **routinely collocates** with a battalion or smaller size unit having a **direct combat** mission.



Women in the Army

DoD and Army Policies

DoD Policy

Memorandum (13 January 1994)

“Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose **primary** mission is to engage in **direct combat on the ground.**”

NOTE: less restrictive than Army policy

Army Policy

AR 600-13 (27 March 1992)

“The Army’s assignment policy for female Soldiers allows women to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty or position except in those specialties, positions or units (battalion size or smaller) which are assigned a **routine** mission to engage in **direct combat**, or which **collocate routinely** with units assigned a **direct combat mission.**”

DIFFERENCES

• MISSION:

- “**Routine** mission” closes a broader range of units and positions to women (i.e. FA, EN, CA, Psy Ops).
- “**Primary** mission” closes a smaller range and potentially opens some of these units, positions to women.

• COMBAT:

- “**Direct combat**” - engaging an enemy...w/ a high risk of capture...or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire, close combat or counterattack (i.e. Cannon FA, INF).
- “**Direct combat on the ground**” - engaging an enemy on the ground...and takes place well forward on the battlefield...

- **COLLOCATION:** **Army Policy further prohibits women** from serving in specialties, positions or units that **collocate routinely** with units assigned a direct combat mission. Collocation - when a unit or position routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal mission to routinely engage in direct combat (i.e. MLRS, CSS to FA).



Women in the Army

Army Gender Assignment Policy Review Timeline

- **10 Dec 09, Initiative to conduct 2010 WITA Cyclic Review of AR 600-13**
- **02 Mar 10, SECARMY authorized DCS, G-1 to proceed with Cyclic Review**
- **30 Apr 10, Tasking Initiated:**
 - ✓ assess the impacts of proposed changes
 - ✓ conduct assessment of all MOS/AOC/ASI/SI currently close to female Soldiers
- **Mar 11, Cyclic Review Results briefed, FY11 NDAA Directed DoD to conduct Comprehensive Review**
 - ✓ SECARMY & SMA concurred but held results until FY11 NDAA review complete
 - ✓ NDAA would review all laws, policies, & regulations that restrict female Service members an opportunity to excel in the Armed Forces
- **Desired Outcome:**
 - ✓ Army align its policy with DoD policy and remove collocation provision
 - ✓ Open MOSs, units, and positions to female Soldiers
 - ✓ Increase career opportunities and recruitment of female Soldiers
 - ✓ Ensure balanced manning of force structure and Soldiers' career development



Cyclic Review Criteria

• Option #1 Partial Alignment of Army Policy with DoD Policy

(1) Replace the word and definition of “**routine**” (in Army policy) with the word and definition of “**primary**” (in DoD policy), and replaces the word and definition of “**direct combat**” (in Army policy) with the word and definition of “**direct ground combat**” (in DoD policy).

(2) Retains the current “**collocation**” policy and definition.

• Option #2 Complete Alignment of Army Policy with DoD Policy

(1) Replace words and definitions as described in COA (1) above.

(2) Remove the current “**collocation**” provision from Army policy.



Women in the Army

Impact to Removal of Collocation (1 of 2)

- Alignment of Army policy with DoD's Policy and eliminate collocation provision results:

Opens six of 30 closed MOSs to female enlisted Soldiers.

MOS Recommend Opening

- 13M MLRS/HIMARS Crew
- 13P MLRS Operations Fire Direction Specialist
- 13R Radar Specialist
- 91A M1 Abrams Tank System Repairer
- 91M Artillery Mechanic
- 91P Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer

Total MOS Impact **approx 10,000 spaces**

Type Units Recommend Opening

- HIMARS
- MLRS
- Area Clearance Platoon
- HQ Section of Clearance Co
- Training Bns/OPFOR

Total Unit Impact **80 units** **approx 3,200 spaces**

Total Force Impact **approx 13,200 spaces**



Women in the Army

Impact to Removal of Collocation (2 of 2)

MOS ASSESSMENT

- **REMAINING CLOSED:**

- 11 Infantry
- 13B Cannon Crewmember
- 13D Field Artillery Automated
- 13F Fire Support Specialist
- 18 Special Forces
- 19 Armor
- 21B/12B Combat Engineer
- 180A Special Forces Warrant

UNITS ASSESSMENT

- **REMAINING CLOSED:**

- Maneuver Battalions
- Anti Armor Company
- Recon Squadrons
- Ranger Battalions
- Long Range Surveillance (LRS)
- Special Forces Battalions
- Engineer Company (BCT)
- Mobility Augmentation Company (MAC)
- Sapper Company
- Special Operations Aviation Battalions
- Cannon Battalions (BCT & FIB)



Reporting Requirements

- **Before implementing any change in policy that:**
 - opens or closes a unit**
 - opens or closes a position within a unit**
 - opens or closes an MOS**
- **SECDEF is required to provide a report to Congress including:**
 - **a detailed description of, and justification for, the proposed changes**
 - **a detailed analysis of legal implication of the proposed changes with respect to the constitutionality of the application of Military Selective Service Act to males only.**
- **Changes may only be implemented after the end of a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress (excluding any day on which either House of Congress is not in session) following the date on which the report is received.**



Women in the Army

FY09 VS FY11 OCCUPATIONS & POSITIONS OPEN TO WOMEN

Occupations

Enlisted MOSs	175 of 203	160 of 180 Open to Women
Warrant Officer MOSs	68 of 69	70 of 71 Open to Women
Commissioned Officer AOCs	194 of 199	182 of 187 Open to Women

92.8% OF OCCUPATIONS IN THE ARMY ARE OPEN TO WOMEN

97.3% OF OCCUPATIONS IN THE ARMY ARE OPEN TO WOMEN

Positions

	AC	ARNG	USAR
% POSITIONS OPEN TO WOMEN	69.8%	71.5%	97.2%
% POSITIONS OPEN TO WOMEN	76.3%	86.2%	97.7%



Path Ahead

- **FY11 NDAA report still pending**
 - **Export submission mid Jan 2012 following Congressional recess**
- **Both DoD and Army expected to announce changes**
 - **Better reflect operational realities of today's personnel landscape**
 - **Continue to expand and increase female opportunities to excel**
- **Barring Congressional concerns should go into effect Spring 2012**



Issues and Discussion



Cultural Support Program Information Briefing

Overall Classification of this briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED



JUNE 28, 2011

Mazr-eSharif, Afghanistan

More than 80 Afghan women gathered at shura to discuss women's roles in peace and security.

The women discussed topics such as:

Defining and increasing women's roles as a key part of the peace and security process

Improving basic livelihood and conditions

How to give women a more active voice in Afghanistan's future



**One moment at the shura
defined the Afghan women's
dream for their future:**

A Re-enlistment



**BG Sean P. Mulholland, deputy commander,
ISAF Regional Command North,
swore in Army Sergeant Christina Baldwin**



The Afghan women were excited to see a general officer pay respect and honor to a lower-ranking female soldier.

**“It is our dream
that one day there will be
the same respect
for our female Soldiers.”**

—An Afghan Policewoman



Why CSTs?

- Ongoing combat operations identified a requirement for a female engagement and outreach capability.
- The CST Program taught at the USAJFKSWCS selects and trains an all female volunteer force.
- CSTs accomplish tasks that would be deemed culturally inappropriate if performed by a male Soldier.



The CST has proven invaluable and is now considered an enduring, global SOF requirement.



Cultural Support Assessment and Selection



Assessment and Selection tests a candidate's:

- Character and ability to maintain composure
- Apply logic
- Communicate clearly and solve problems in a physically and mentally demanding environment.

Pre-requisites to attend A&S

- ✓ GT score of 100 or better
- ✓ APFT Score of 210; at least 70 points in each event
- ✓ Meet height and weight requirements; current physical
- ✓ Deployable, no physical limitations
- ✓ Current secret security clearance



Leader giving guidance during team event in A&S



Six Week Cultural Support Training Course

<p style="text-align: center;">Inprocessing (3 Days)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » APFT » Personnel/Medical Records » Course Orientation » Equipment Issue 	<p style="text-align: center;">Soldier Survivability (5 Days)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Weapons Familiarization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » M4/M9 (Day/Night) » M249 Fire » M240B Fire » Battle Drills » Equipment Familiarization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » MBITR » NVG » Medical Familiarization 	<p style="text-align: center;">Operational Orientation (4.5 Days)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Introduction to CST » Introduction to SO Missions » Stress on the Objective » Mental Skills Foundation (SOCEP) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Building Confidence » Energy Management » Attention Control » Creative Imagery » Meta-Cognitive Obstacle Course » Adaptive and Critical Thinking <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Physical Adaptability » Mental Adaptability » Interpersonal Adaptability 	<p style="text-align: center;">Culture (8 Days)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Human Behavior » General Culture » Regional Culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Geography » History » Administration » Religion » Environmental Health » Perspective on and of Women's Roles » Dynamics of Male presence » Use of local dress
<p style="text-align: center;">Engagement (3 Days)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Interpreters » Special Operations Reporting » Engaging People » Inform and Influence Activities » Legal Aspects » Media Relations/Public Affairs 	<p style="text-align: center;">Tactical Searches and Information Gathering (4 Days)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Basic Tactical Searches » Physical Search » Tactical Questioning » Round Robin PEs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Physical Search » Interpreter » SO Reporting 	<p style="text-align: center;">Culex 3.5 Days</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Direct Action Lanes » Village Stability Operations Lanes 	<p style="text-align: center;">Outprocessing 2 Days</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Administrative <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » Personnel » Graduation » Unit Assignment » Equipment Turn-In



Cultural Support Team Core Tasks

- Support Medical Civic Action Programs
- Conduct Search and Seizure
- Support Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
- Support Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
- Conduct Key Leader Engagements





The Future of the Cultural Support Program

- USAJFKSWCS will:
 - Recruit females into Civil Affairs
 - Upon graduation of the Civil Affairs Qualification Course Soldiers will earn the CA MOS and the Professional Development Skill Identifier of Cultural Support Specialist
 - Soldiers will be language qualified
- These CA Soldiers will be assigned to companies within the 95th CA Brigade or at one of the active duty SF groups.
- Teams will consists of four Soldiers, with one Soldier from the team having received advanced medical training at the CA Medical Sergeants Course.





Way Ahead

- USAJFKSWCS is postured to meet operational requirements for CSTs from through a one-year utilization tour of volunteers from their parent unit.
- USAJFKSWCS is asking the United States Army Accessions Command to formalize the volunteer process in the Fiscal Year 2012 recruiting mission.
- The USAJFKSWCS Concept Plan for the Cultural Support Program outlines a bridging strategy that builds upon existing recruiting and training venues along with planned force structure to achieve an initial operating capability of one Civil Affairs company of five CSTs by 2014, and a fully operational capability of 25 teams throughout ARSOF by Fiscal Year 2016.



APRIL 2011

Helmand Province, Afghanistan



The Helmand Province is a major point of contention between the Taliban and Coalition Forces.

**Coalition Forces
brought healthcare,
food and security
to the area.**

**But the Taliban whispered deceit in
the ears of the people.**

**To ease
their fears**

**The CST
set up a
Medical Clinic
for women
and children.**



but no one came



**For three weeks the CST did medical outreach,
only to find deserted, dusty streets.**

Finally, an elderly woman made her way up the road with her son.





The women in the village knew if the wise woman said it was safe, their husbands and fathers would let them come.

The next week
she returned with
two women.

And the next week
there were more

AND MORE

AND MORE





**Defense Advisory Committee on Women in
the Service (DACOWITS)
December Meeting**

**Suicide Rates Briefing
VA**

Janet Kemp

VA Mental Health Program Director , Suicide Prevention

Briefing overview

- Veteran suicide statistics are not routinely collected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
- Rates cited by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) refer only to those Veterans who get care in VA
- These statistics are derived by combining the the National Death Index information (from the CDC) together with VA enrollment information
- We are only able to report on deaths through 2008

Facts about Veteran Suicide

- 30,000 - 32,000 US deaths from suicide per year among the population overall (*Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*)
- Approximately:
 - 20 percent are Veterans
National Violent Death Reporting System
 - 18 deaths from suicide per day are Veterans
National Violent Death Reporting System
 - 5 suicide related deaths per day among Veterans receiving care in Veterans Health Administration (VHA) *Veterans Affairs Serious Mental Illness Treatment, Research and Evaluation Center*
 - 950 suicide attempts per month among Veterans receiving care as reported by VHA suicide prevention coordinators (October 1, 2008 – December 31, 2010)


Facts about Veteran Suicide (continued)

- 11 percent (1051/10,228) of those who attempted suicide in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 (and did not die as a result of this attempt) made a repeat suicide attempt with an average of 9 months of follow-up
- 7 percent (724/10,228) of suicide attempts resulted in death. Among those who survived their first suicide attempt and reattempted suicide within 9 months of their first FY 2009 event, approximately 6 percent (60/1051) died from suicide
- 33 percent of recent suicides have a history of previous attempts
VA National Suicide Prevention Coordinator reports
- 19 percent (191/996) of those that died by suicide were last seen by primary care (April 2010- June, 2011)
VA National Suicide Prevention Coordinator reports


Suicide Rates* of VHA Users, by OEF/OIF Status and Fiscal Year: All VHA Users



Suicide Rates* of VHA Users, by OEF/OIF Status and Fiscal Year: Male All Ages



Suicide Rates* of VHA Users, by OEF/OIF Status and Fiscal Year: Female All ages



Veterans Crisis Line

	Total Calls	Veterans	Family/ Friend	SPC Referrals	Rescue	Active Duty
Sept. 2011	15,903	10,731	1,404	3,044	582	218
<i>FY 11</i>	164,101	102,446	12,221	29,334	6,760	2,290
<i>FY 10</i>	134,528	81,805	9,925	19,970	5,732	1,744
<i>FY 09</i>	118,984	63,934	7,553	13,960	3,709	1,589
<i>FY 08</i>	67,350	29,879	4,517	6,264	1,749	780
<i>FY 07</i>	9,379	2,918	No avail.	739	139	93

From: Veterans Crisis Line database

VA Suicide Prevention Strategies

- Ready access to high quality mental health care and other care
- Identification of high risk individuals and implementation of an “enhanced package of care”
- Improved monitoring and acquisition of data strategies
- Veterans Crisis Line and Veterans Chat

Gender Gap in Retention

Prepared for:
DACOWITS

6 December 2011





Contents

- Background
- Active Duty Continuation Rates
- Reserve Continuation Rates
- Guard Continuation Rates
- Summary




Background

- Continuation rates were used as an estimate of Service member retention in the same Service, component, and rank (Enlisted/Officer) in subsequent years.
- Continuation reports use a base population of the military strength that year. It follows the base population and tracks the retention rate after four years.
- Deployment status indicates whether a member was deployed at any time during the retention period.
- Population includes:
 - Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force
 - Active Duty and Selected Reserve (SELRES)
 - Warrant Officers are grouped with Commissioned Officers.



Active Duty Retention after 4 Years of Service




Serving Those Who Serve Our Country




Active Duty Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service


Army




Navy



Marine Corps



Air Force




— Male — Female

Serving Those Who Serve Our Country




Active Duty Continuation Rate by Rank


Army




Navy



Marine Corps



Air Force




— Officer Male - - Officer Female Enlisted Male Enlisted Female

Serving Those Who Serve Our Country




Active Duty Continuation Rate by Deployment Status






Reserve (SELRES) Retention after 4 Years of Service






Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service


Army




Navy



Marine Corps



Air Force




— Male — Female

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


Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank


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
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Marine Corps



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


— — Officer Male
 — — Officer Female
 Enlisted Male
 Enlisted Female

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


Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Deployment Status






Guard (SELRES) Retention after 4 Years of Service






Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service

Army



Air Force




— Male — Female




Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank

Army




Air Force



— Officer Male - - Officer Female Enlisted Male Enlisted Female



Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Deployment Status





Summary

- 4-year retention rates are improving across all Services, regardless of gender, since FY 2004.
- In general, 4-year retention of females is lower than males; however, the gap is not widening.
- Deployed female retention numbers in this analysis appear to be higher; however, female deployed rates occur at lower proportions than males.
- DMDC is willing to complete further analysis as needed.



QUESTIONS?

ANGELLA MCGINNIS

(703) 588-0484



Back Up Slides




Slide 5

Active Duty Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service




Active Duty Army Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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
Active Duty Navy Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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
Active Duty Marine Corps Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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Active Duty Air Force Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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


Slide 6

Active Duty Continuation Rate by Rank




Active Duty Army Continuation Rate by Rank



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
Active Duty Navy Continuation Rate by Rank



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
Active Duty Marine Corps Continuation Rate by Rank



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Active Duty Air Force Continuation Rate by Rank



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


Slide 9

**Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years
of Service**




Army Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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
Navy Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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
Marine Corps Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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Air Force Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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


Slide 10

Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank




Army Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank



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
Navy Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank



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
Marine Corps Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank



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Air Force Reserve (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank



Serving Those Who Serve Our Country




Slide 13

**Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years
of Service**




Army Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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Air Force Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate after 4 Years of Service



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


Slide 14

Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank




Army Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank



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Air Force Guard (SELRES) Continuation Rate by Rank



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reason for leaving was failure to be promoted. Although there were fewer female officer responses to analyze, the high frequency of deployments and the desire to settle in one location were both listed as primary motivations for separating. Among male enlisted servicemembers, low pay and low allowances was the most frequently cited reason for leaving; among female enlisted servicemembers, involuntary separation or ineligibility to reenlist was the most frequently cited reason. Overall, however, none of the data points to a single reason or single set of reasons that can explain why women haven't chosen to leave military service at higher rates than men.

DACOWITS Should Expand Its Focus to Include an Explanation of the Gender Gap in Retention

Recommendation 12—

Where appropriate, DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to include an explanation of the gender gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, DACOWITS should examine the effects of retention programs, such as the sabbatical programs currently offered by the Navy and the Coast Guard as well as any other innovative Service-specific approaches to retention. Findings and recommendations from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

Because the data do not clearly indicate why more women leave service earlier and at greater rates than men, the Commission recommends that the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) expand its current focus on retention to examine the gender gap in retention. This examination should also explore why women are less likely to view the military as a career and should help to identify existing policies and practices that may effectively decrease the retention gap between men and women.

The Commission also suggests that DACOWITS examine the effectiveness of a number of sabbatical programs. All the Services currently offer a number of these programs to enhance retention among their servicemembers. However, because the law prohibits the award of benefits to individuals solely based on gender, designing retention programs specifically aimed at women is challenging. Thus, retention outcomes related to three potentially effective, and legal, sabbatical programs should be more fully explored.

In FY 2009, the Navy began to conduct a pilot program, the Career Intermission Pilot Program, to encourage retention through enhanced career flexibility. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 allows 20 officers and 20 enlisted members in each Service to participate in the program each year. The program, which is open to both men and women, allows officers and enlisted personnel to temporarily (for up to three years) take time off from active duty. Participants in the program transition from the AC to the Individual Ready Reserve during this period. Although those who participate in a career intermission do not receive active-duty pay or allowances, they do retain medical and dental care benefits and continued access to

commissaries, exchanges, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs. Servicemembers incur an additional active-duty service obligation of two months for every month of participation in this career intermission. Upon their return to active duty, participants return at the same rank they held upon entering the program.

The Coast Guard has two sabbatical programs worthy of exploring. The first, Care for Newborn Children, and the second, Temporary Separation Program, are restricted to individuals who are at the rank of E-4/O-3 or above. To qualify for Care for Newborn Children, at least four years of active-duty service in the Coast Guard are required; six years are required to qualify for the Temporary Separation Program. Both programs allow for up to a 24-month absence, and the servicemember receives no pay or benefits while away. Upon return, individuals are reinstated at the same rank they held upon leaving, assuming that they meet physical fitness requirements and return within two years. Servicemembers may take advantage of one sabbatical, but not both.

The Commission suggests that DACOWITS examine the available data on these leave programs as well as other innovative Service programs and assess the effect of their expansion on female retention. The Commission also recommends that DACOWITS disseminate the findings and recommendations from its review to a wide audience, including the Secretary of Defense. This can help facilitate the use of successful retention practices that close the gender gap across Services.



MEMORANDUM

To: Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)
From: Elise Van Winkle
Defense Intelligence Group
Date: November 29, 2011
Re: Gender Gap in the Retention of Service Members

In its March 2011 report, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), created by Congress, encouraged DACOWITS to look more closely at the gender gap in retention between men and women Service members. MLDC suggested that this examination explore “why women are less likely to view the military as a career and ... help to identify existing policies and practices that may effectively decrease the retention gap between men and women.” To begin this examination the Committee requested a review by ICF of any recent research that has been done on the issue of retention differences between men and women military personnel. The review should draw on previous DACOWITS reports as well as recent RAND reports. The review should include recommendations that have been made as a result of this research to address retention, with specific attention to women.

In its 2004 report, DACOWITS examined gender differences in military separations (i.e., numbers leaving the military in a given fiscal year), using data provided at DACOWITS’ request by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). In its 2006 report, the retention and career progression of military women in the professional fields (JAGs, physicians and clergy), a small but important subset of military women, was examined. Findings from both these earlier reports are relevant to the topic, and are therefore summarized in a later section of this memorandum.

Measuring the Gender Gap in Retention

For a very basic reason we can hypothesize that, in any given year, a gender gap in retention will exist. This is because the distribution of rank and seniority across the two genders is not the same. *Seniority*—how long one has already been in the military—is a very powerful predictor of retention. Military members in more senior grades, *regardless of their gender*, have higher retention rates, due in part to a strong incentive to stay in service the closer one approaches eligibility for retirement benefits. This means that if disproportionately fewer women personnel occupy junior grades compared to their male counterparts—which is currently the case—women’s retention *overall* (i.e., not adjusting for rank) will be lower than men’s during any given year. This observation tells us nothing about *why* women occupy lower grades on average, but it does provide important context and background as DACOWITS explores the data further and in more detail.


An important first step is to examine the most current data available on the rates of separation for men and women military personnel, and confirm that there is, in fact, a gender gap in retention rates. More importantly, we must examine gender-specific rates of retention in each rank group, and by service. To accomplish this, DACOWITS requested that DMDC provide these data (without personal identifying information) for the most recent fiscal year available, broken out by rank, service and gender. An additional step taken by ICF was to examine existing DoD survey data on career intentions, collected periodically from currently serving personnel. Findings from these baseline data can be further augmented and explored using qualitative research, such as data from focus groups, and using information from exit-surveys of Service members who have chosen to separate

from the military. In the paragraphs below, we present results of our preliminary analysis of quantitative and qualitative data sources.

Measures of Retention: Intent to Stay

On their annual *Status of Forces* survey, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) asks Service members about their intent to stay in the military. As shown in Figure 1, the *November 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members* shows gender differences in intention, overall, are minimal. Specifically, when looking at the likelihood of a Service member staying in the military, approximately equal percentages of men and women report being “very unlikely” or “unlikely” to stay if given the choice. This finding is similar to other research which has found negligible gender differences when looking only at *intent* to leave the military.¹ Breaking these data out by enlisted vs. officer respondents however, there is a noticeable difference in intentions between men and women officers, with more women officers expressing a desire to leave compared to their men officer counterparts.

Figure 1



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) *November 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members Tabulations of Responses*, Q23. Suppose that you have to decide whether to stay on active duty. Assuming you could stay, how likely is it that you would choose to do so?


Measures of Retention: Separation Rates

As opposed to measuring a Service member’s *intent* to separate, actual separation rates provide behavioral data and can be relied on to provide a more accurate assessment of retention and attrition differences between genders. DMDC provided data on active duty separations for FY 2011. To calculate a separation rate for each subgroup examined (e.g., by rank group), we compared the total number of separations for that group against the

¹ Edwards, D. (2002). *Impact of Quality of Life on the Reenlistment Intentions of Junior Enlisted United States Marines* (Master’s Thesis). Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a401619.pdf>.


total number of personnel in uniform for that group in the previous fiscal year. As shown in Figure 2, active duty women separate at higher rates than active duty men across all DoD Services. Figure 3 further shows that this gender gap in separation rates is consistent across junior and senior ranks, and across enlisted and officer personnel. Our earlier observation about the role of seniority is evident in the rates of separation for the Marine Corps, which, because it is a younger service with a smaller proportion of its personnel in senior grades, has the expected higher rate of separation.

Figure 2



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)

Figure 3



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)

These data match closely with MLDC and previous DACOWITS findings on the topic. MLDC examined data of continuation rates from FY 2000-2008 (for the Active Component: AC) and FY 2004-2009 (for the Reserve Component: RC), and found that women's continuation rates are lower than those of men across Services in both the AC and RC. DACOWITS examined the retention of commissioned officers in 2002, and found that, regardless of length of service, women had lower continuation rates. In 2004, DACOWITS examined the issue further, and 2003 continuation rate data showed that the gender gap in retention was most pronounced among members at the five to eight year service mark. MLDC concluded, based on their examination of continuation rate data from 2000 - 2008 and 2004 - 2009 that the gender gap in officer retention does not emerge until the 4-year mark, and is most prominent between eight to twelve years of service.

Possible Explanations for Gender Differences in Retention and Attrition

While the DMDC data shown in Figure 1 fail to show stark contrasts between men and women Service members on their likelihood of staying in the military, separation data show that there exists a gender gap in retention. To better understand this gender gap, studies have examined reasons for staying or leaving the Service, and overall seem to show consistent gender differences. DACOWITS conducted focus groups in 2003 to solicit Service members' and their family members' views on the reasons why women officers leave the military at higher rates than men officers. Focus group participants cited family reasons (e.g., to devote more time and priority to family commitments and responsibilities) as the top reason why women officers leave the Service. The other most commonly cited reasons for leaving: poor work environment for women, poor job characteristics, and incompatibility with the military lifestyle. In 2004, DACOWITS conducted focus groups to examine officers' – both men and women – reasons for deciding to stay or leave the military. Work-family balance again emerged as the most common theme for why men and women officers decide to leave the military. These focus groups largely did not examine reasons for why gender differences exist in retention rates. Of note, though, female enlisted members were more likely than female officers to stress negative unit climate themes as a reason for leaving the military.

A 2002 study of junior enlisted U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) recruits – using data from a USMC retention survey – highlighted gender differences in reasons for staying or leaving the military.² Looking at reasons Marines *stay* in the military, the study found that, compared to women, men more commonly reported morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs and job responsibility as factors impacting their decision to stay. Conversely, women Marines were more likely than men to cite availability of day care, family support services, family medical care, and the quality of education benefits as factors influencing their decision to stay in the Service. When asked to remark on factors that may influence their decision to *leave* the military, women were more likely to report that a lack of trust in Marine leadership was a reason to leave.

An additional mode of data collection includes exit surveys. Exit-surveys are conducted among Service members who have made the decision to leave the military and can be a reliable source for gathering data on factors that influence retention. In 2004, DACOWITS examined responses to a DoD-wide exit survey conducted in 2000. Male officers' top five cited reasons for leaving the military included: desire to start a second career before becoming too old, overall job satisfaction, desire to settle in a particular location, pay and allowances, and promotion/advancement opportunities. For female officers, the top five most cited reasons for leaving included: overall job satisfaction, desire to settle in a particular location, not getting desirable or appropriate assignments, pay and allowances, and desire to continue education.

MLDC examined responses to more recent exit surveys conducted by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) in March 2010. MLDC found minor differences in how men and women ordered the relative importance of various factors influencing the decision to leave. However, much like when

² Edwards, D. (2002). *Impact of Quality of Life on the Reenlistment Intention of Junior Enlisted United States Marines*(Master's Thesis). Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a401619.pdf>

DACOWITS examined exit surveys from 2000, MLDC found that men and women largely cited similar factors (i.e., dissatisfaction with their job, low pay, and lack of promotion or advancement opportunities) as playing the largest role in their decision to leave the military.

Despite a great deal of research indicating family-related reasons are a major factor for women Service members considering separation from the military, neither of the above-mentioned exit surveys listed these issues as possible reasons for separating and were therefore unable to account for this potentially relevant concern. However, an Air Force (AF) questionnaire conducted by DiSilverio (2000) with 600 departing female officers allowed respondents to mention family-related factors as a reason for separating from the military.³ These data revealed that, out of a number of possible factors, desire to spend more time with family was the number one reason for female AF officers leaving the military, followed by desire for geographic stability, need to stay home with children, dissatisfaction with leadership, and desire to start a family.

Additional Retention Challenges

Research has shown that as a group, in addition to women, junior enlisted personnel consistently struggle with maintaining tenure in the military, with one study citing more than half of junior enlisted Service members, who responded to an Equal Opportunity Survey, indicating they are “very unlikely” or “unlikely” to stay in the military.⁴ It is therefore no surprise that research has shown women junior enlisted Service members have exaggerated attrition rates compared to other groups. A 2005 RAND study, sponsored by Army, examined factors affecting attrition and retention of first-term Soldiers. Of note, from FY 1995 to FY 2001, for enlisted Army personnel, only 40% of women completed their first term of enlisted service compared to 59% of men.⁵ Early separation (within the first six months) was also higher among women (37%) than men (24%). These data are corroborated by FY 2011 DMDC separation rate data (see Figure 3), in which junior enlisted women separate at significantly higher rates than junior enlisted men.

Several factors may account for this gender gap in attrition of early recruits. While the RAND study did not directly examine the causes for this gender gap, the authors did find that women were promoted to sergeant on average one and a half months slower than their male counterparts. Fitness may also be a factor. RAND found that women were more likely than men to be assigned to a fitness training unit (FTU; at around a 10% rate for women and at a 2.5% rate for men), and the probability of leaving the Army in the first six months is higher for FTU participants (28% compared to 16%). The RAND authors suggested that FTU training is ineffective in preventing participants from struggling in the Army. It should be noted that factors other than fitness may contribute to FTU participants’ high attrition rates, however. RAND noted that FTU participants were more likely to be discharged for performance and conduct problems, and actually were not necessarily more prone to discharge due to fitness reasons, compared to their peers. The authors hypothesized that stigma from being placed in a fitness program, discouragement, and low baseline levels of fitness likely lead to these individuals being discharged at a high rate.

Research has also found racial/ethnic differences in military satisfaction rates, which likely contribute to retention, specifically looking at the equal opportunity climate. Studies using the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS) have looked at members’ perception of the military’s equal opportunity climate.⁶

³ DiSilverio, L.A.H. (2000). *Winning the Retention Wars: The USAF, Women Officers and the Need for Transformation*. Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) Technical Report: ADA424385 (Fort Belvoir, VA: DTIC).

⁴ Moore, B.L. (2001). *Beyond Race and Gender: Motivating Enlisted Personnel to Remain in Today's Military Today's Military*. Ft. Belvoir Defense Technical Information Center Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA403440>.

⁵ Buddin, R. (2005). *Success of First-Term Soldiers: The Effects of Recruiting Practices and Recruit Characteristics*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

⁶ Moore, B.L. & Webb, S.C. (2000). Perceptions of equal opportunity among women and minority army personnel. *Sociological Inquiry*, 70, 215-239.

They found, overall, men held more favorable opinions than women of the equal opportunity climate. In addition, white Service members held more favorable opinions than racial minority Service members, officers held more favorable opinions than enlisted personnel, and minority enlisted women held more favorable opinions than minority officer women, who were the least favorable group of the military's equal opportunity climate. An additional study by Moore (2000) found that, when breaking racial/ethnic differences out further, non-Hispanic African Americans held less favorable opinions than Hispanics of the overall equal opportunity climate.⁷ This same study found that white women Service members reported more favorable perceptions compared with minority men.

Deployment and mobilizations present additional challenges in retention. A 2011 RAND study found that lengthy deployments (e.g. over 12 months) were a primary predictor of decisions to not reenlist above and beyond gender, race/ethnicity, and years in service.⁸ This impact of deployment and mobilization has been echoed in other studies as well. A 2010 study found that among Navy Reservists faced with a decision to stay or leave the military, females who had been mobilized to Iraq and/or Afghanistan had higher rates of leaving the Navy than males with similar mobilizations.⁹

Recommendations on Retention Issues

As a result of ongoing concerns regarding gender differences in retention and attrition within the military, DACOWITS made the following recommendations in 2003:

1. The Department and Services should continue to explore additional options that affect personal/family time, which may include those contained in the forthcoming RAND Return on Investment Study on military leave programs.
2. The personal and family leave programs instituted by the Coast Guard (i.e., Care for Newborn Children and Temporary Separation programs) and contemplated by the Navy be evaluated as soon as possible for their impact on retention and that this information be disseminated to the other Services and to military personnel and families.
3. Commanders continue efforts to ensure that the work environment is neither hostile nor discriminatory and is conducive to optimal utilization and retention of highly qualified female officers.

In 2004, DACOWITS continued to address retention differences between male and female Service members. They subsequently made the following recommendations:

1. The Services should examine in greater detail the reasons for the discrepancy between the reported intentions and actual retention of married officers with children.
2. Future Status of Forces (SOF) and exit surveys for all constituencies should ask specific questions focused on factors that make balancing military Service and family responsibilities a challenge.
3. Consistent with the intention of DOD Social Compact, the Services should provide for flexibility in addressing work/family balance, such as offering families the option of remaining at the installation of assignment to meet extenuating family commitments.

⁷ Moore, B.L. & Webb, S.C. (2000). Perceptions of equal opportunity among women and minority army personnel. *Sociological Inquiry*, 70, 215-239.

⁸ Hosek, J.. (2011). How is deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan affecting U.S. Service members and their families. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation).

⁹ S. J. Krispin (2010). *Assessing the Effect of Mobilization on Enlisted Reserve Retention* (Master's Thesis). Retrieved from: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531506.pdf>.

4. The Services should review exiting programs and policies designed to promote career retention, identifying and reporting on opportunities to apply them more broadly, especially to married officers with children.
5. The Services should develop and implement programs designed to address special circumstance that many female officers experience in their fifth to eighth year of service, such as childbirth and child rearing.
6. The Services should develop Leave of Absence/Sabbatical programs as means of increasing retention rates, such as the proposed Navy Surface Warfare Officer Sabbatical and the Coast Guard's existing Care for Newborn Children and Temporary Separation Programs. Support should be given to the legislative authority needed to execute these programs.
7. The Services should reexamine the use of "optional career paths" to accommodate changes in personal goals, particularly for officers.
8. The Services should determine whether new benefit, compensation, and bonus programs could be developed to more effectively retain experienced personnel as they reach mid-career. Possible examples include providing children of Service members greater access to ROTC scholarship programs, expanding transferability of Montgomery GI Bill benefits to dependent children, and allowing additional enrollment opportunities for Montgomery GI bill benefits.

A 2005 RAND study examining success and retention of first-term soldiers made numerous recommendations as well, including two recommendations particularly relevant in addressing the gender gap in retention:

1. Investigate policies to help at-risk demographic groups: *Army recruiting cannot afford to screen out women, GEDs, and others who have high attrition rates. The Army needs to investigate whether it can better inform these groups about what is expected of them in the Army. In addition, the Army should develop programs to help at-risk recruits adapt to the Army and show them how they can improve their chances of success. As we have already noted, the Assessment of Individual Motivation and similar tools of this genre might be helpful in these endeavors.*
2. Build an automated system to track recruit problems, remediation efforts, and results: *Current automated data files provide too little information about attrition. The reported reasons for attrition are vague (e.g., trainee discharge or unsatisfactory performance) and inconsistently recorded. The Army should develop more objective criteria that can be more uniformly implemented. In addition, the Army should track a history of problems and remediation efforts that were taken to address those problems. This new information system would help the Army identify the underlying reasons for attrition and structure policies to address those reasons. The tracking information would also help the Army sort out what types of interventions and mediations are effective in helping at-risk recruits. We recommend early and continuing efforts to connect this information with information gleaned from AIM testing, pre-accession fitness metrics, and other assessments.*

In 2006, DACOWITS found that family and work-life balance issues seriously impact retention and advancement for women in military professions of lawyers, doctors, and clergy (LCD). Given the nature of the Armed Forces and the need for flexibility among military personnel in terms of deployments and variety and frequency of changing assignments, DACOWITS felt it may not be possible for most female LCDs to reconcile these expectations with family responsibilities. In 2006, the Committee made the following recommendations with an intention of improving recruitment, retention, and advancement of women to the highest levels within these professional categories:

1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should conduct a study to assess the feasibility of extending the window for entering the spousal preference hiring program from 30 days to 90 days to potentially decrease the length of time that families are without a second income.
2. In regards to lawyers, pilot programs of on-off ramps should be implemented in all of the Services to provide flexibility for work-life balance concerns, such as care for newborns, aging parents, and critically ill family members.
3. The Navy should institutionalize the initiative, discussed by Rear Admiral McDonald in a 4 December 2006 DACOWITS briefing, that provides broader windows in which to achieve career milestones such as sea duty and mandatory schooling.
4. The Services with Offices of the Chief of Chaplains should conduct surveys of male and female chaplains and chaplain assistants to assess the acceptance of female chaplains across the Services.
5. Status of Forces surveys should include questions about Service members' experiences with female clergy.
6. An annual conference, similar to the one the Air Force holds for female clergy, be held for female Army and Navy clergy. The purpose of the recommended conference would be to provide female chaplains training and to offer them an opportunity to voice concerns and exchange ideas and support for dealing with the unique challenges they face.
7. Training should be provided to enhance evaluation report writing skills for male and female clergy and their supervisors.
8. The Services should determine the extent to which there are gender-based clergy assignments and the impact of those assignments on female chaplains' careers.
9. The Navy and Air Force should set goals for recruiting female clergy to increase their overall representation in the military chaplaincy.
10. Task additional female clergy to assist in recruiting by highlighting their own roles and contributions to the clergy and military in order to increase the number of female chaplains.
11. The Services should survey all field grade doctors who leave the military in order to determine their reasons for leaving and to assist the Medical Corps in retaining highly qualified individuals.
12. The Services should review the Navy's medical officer career development process, which may provide insight for best practices when addressing promotion rates for female physicians.
13. In regards to doctors, pilot programs of on-off ramps should be implemented in all of the Services to provide flexibility for work-life balance concerns, such as care for newborns, aging parents, and critically ill family members.
14. Increase the exposure of potential doctors to the military lifestyle. In focus groups with members of the JAG Corps, the summer internship program was highly recommended. This is a best practice that the Medical Corps should review.
15. Increase the exposure of future doctors to the practice of military medicine through shadowing programs for first- and second-year medical students and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) participants.
16. Top ROTC science students should receive pamphlets with information about USUHS.
17. Increase the number of educational delay slots granted to ROTC and Service academy graduates for medical school.
18. Increase the enrollment at the USUHS medical school.

A 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report highlighted U.S. Army's challenges in promoting and retaining officers.¹⁰ Projections showed that Army will have a shortage of at least 3,000 officers each year through FY 2013. Though the other Services did not report problems in meeting overall officer accession needs, they did struggle to access officers in certain MOS's, such as physicians, dentists and nurses. Considering women officers are separating at a higher rate than men officers, focusing efforts on retaining these women officers will help lessen the Army's projected officer shortage. The GAO report recommended that Army should take the following actions to develop and implement a strategic plan to address their retention shortfalls:

1. Develop an overall annual accession goal to supplement specialty-specific goals in order to facilitate better long-term planning,
2. Perform an analysis to identify risks associated with accession and retention shortfalls and develop procedures for managing the risks, and
3. Make decisions on how resources should best be allocated to balance near-and long-term officer shortfalls.

Summary of Findings

Empirical literature has consistently found gender differences in retention and attrition within the military. Actual separation rates mirror these findings, providing stark contrasts between women and men Service members in rates of separation across Services and ranks. DACOWITS has conducted investigations into these gender differences and found, similar to academic and military research, women Service members tend to place higher emphasis on work-life balance and family issues when considering whether to stay in the military. In 2003 and 2004, DACOWITS made specific recommendations in an attempt to close the gender gap. Since that time, empirical research and separation data continue to demonstrate the gender gap in retention remains a concern. This is exceptionally relevant in light of data indicating the Services, particularly Army, continue to have difficulty meeting their accession needs across all MOS's.

Though there is continuing interest in this issue, there is a relative shortage of recent research which directly investigates gender differences across all Services and demographics. The most effective method to study retention would be to follow Service members over time using a longitudinal design. To our knowledge, this study structure has yet to be utilized. Specifically, the military would benefit from tracking Service members' responses on Status of Forces-type surveys across years and mapping these responses to actual separations. In performing this type of analysis, the military can identify specific factors which predict future separation, including, though not limited to, demographics and responses to questions on military satisfaction, family stress, and combat exposure.

¹⁰ United States Government Accountability Office (2007). *Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges*. (GAO-07-224: Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives)